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THE PEOPLE, Respondent, v. ORVAL LUCAS et aI.,
Appellants.
[1] Taxa.tion-Sale for Delinquent Taxes-Redemption-Amount
Required.-Thc amount of "sold taxes" required by Rev. &
Tax. Code, § 4102, to redcem property sold to the state for delinquent taxes is a combination of taxes that were a lien
on the propel·ty when sold to the state and the taxes asscssed
for each subsequent year as shown on the delinquent rolls or
that wonld have been shown had the property been assessed
,vhere it was not assessed for· any year (Rev. & Tax. Code,
§ 123). Since the assessments for these years must take into
. aecount any reduction in value in the years following removal
of timber from the land (Rev. & Tax. Code, §§ 123, 401, 405,
406, 566, 4104), the mere fact that the redemptioners paid
the back taxes on the property does not mean that they paid
taxes on removed timber.
.
[2] ld.-Sale for Delinquent Taxes - Redemption - Amount Required.-Taxes are exactions for the support of government,
110t the purchase price of property, and by paying taxes on
redemption the redemptionel's are paying the amount due for

[1] See Oal.Jur.2d, Taxation, § 313; Am.Jur., Taxation, §§ 1100,
1103,1118.
licK. Dig. References: [1, 2] Taxation, § 335; [3J Taxation,
~ 362; [4] Taxation, § 329; [5,8,9] Taxation, § 338; [6] Taxation,
§ 323; [7] Taxation, § 327; [10-13, 15] Taxation, § 324; [14J Remainders and Reversions, § 11.
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that support, not buying the land and timber. Even if redemption could be regarded as a purchase, it would be a purchase of the land in the condition it was in at the time of
redemption, and the state would be no less entitled to proceeds from the property during its ownership than it would
had the property been sold at public auction.
ld.-Tax Deeds-Effect.-A tax deed to the state for delinquent taxes conveys absolute title to the property. The state
can occupy such property and exploit its natural resources and
has the exclusive right to all proceeds from the property, including proceeds from such resources (Rev. & Tax. Code,
§§ 3441, 3651), and it can improve the property or allow it
to deteriorate in value.
ld.-Sale for Delinquent Taxes-Redemption.-Statutory provisions authorizing redemption from tax sales are simply an
offer by the state to reconvey the property on the terms prescribed if it has not already been sold at public auction.
ld.-Sale for Delinquent Taxes-Redemption-Rights of Redemptioner.-The statutes authorizing redemption from tax
sales cannot reasonably be construed as implying that on
redemption the redemptioner is entitled to the property in the
condition it was in at the time of the tax deed.
Id.-8ale for Delinquent Taxes-Purchasers-Title.-The only
difference between the title acquired by the state at a tax sale
and that of a private purchaser is the privilege of redemption;
that is, the state's title is absolute, but subject to defeasance
should the former owner exercise his privilege of redemp.
tion.
ld.-Sale for Delinquent Taxes-Purchasers-Rights-Rents
and Profits.-While rights incident to ownership of property
conveyed to the state for delinquent taxes are no more limited
than those of an individual who has title to real property and
while they cease on transfer of title, certain rights, such as
that to rents and profits which accrued during the period of
ownership, are personal and do not pass with the deed or
cease to be actionable on conveyance of the property.
Id.-Sale for Delinquent Taxes-Redemption-Effect.-Under
Rev. & Tax. Code, § 4112, a tax deed is not void from the beginning but only on redemption; the state's interest in the land
then ceases because title has passed to the redemptioner.
ld.-Sale for Delinquent Taxes-Redemption-Effect.-A right
of action which accrued during the time the state was the
owner of property conveyed to it for delinquent taxes is not
terminated by redemption; the state is in the sallie position
as that of an individual who conveys land to which he has
title.

566

:)

PEOPLE tI. LUCAS

[55 C.2d

[10] Id.-Sale for Delinquent Tuea--Purchasera--Rights.-The
phrase "arising in any manner" in Rev. & Tax. Code, § 3651,
relating to tqe state's right to receive all proceeds from taxdeeded property. precludes the drawing of nny distinction
according to the manner in which the proceeds arise, wht'ther
from rent or from the sale of timber.
[11] Id.-Sale for Delinquent Tuea--Purcha.sers-Rights.-The
mnking of any exception to the state's right "to receive all
proceeds arising in any manner" from tax-deeded property (Rev. & Tax. Code, § 3651) for proceeds from the sale of
timber is foreclosed by Rev. & Tax. Code, § 3441, which makes
it a misdemeanor to do any act tending permanently to impair
the value of tax-deeded property, including the cutting or
removal of timber, and expressly provides for recovery of
damages by the state for such cutting or removal.
[12] Id.-Sale for Delinquent Tues-Purcha.sera--Rights.-The
making of any exception to the state's right to receive all
proceeds from tax-deeded property (Rev. & Tax. Code, § 3651)
for a redemptioner is foreclosed by Rev. & Tax. Code, § 3441,
relating to impairment of value of such property, which refers
to "every person" and therefore to a redemptioner as well as a
stranger to the title.
[18] Id.-8ale for Delinquent Tues-Purchasera--Rights.-No
atatute makes the state's right to recover proceeds arising
from tax-deeded property depend on whether there bas been
a redemption.
[14] Remainders and Reversiona--Actiona.-A person having an
estate in fee or in remainder or a reversion may maintain an
action for injury to the inheritance though, after its commission, his estate is transferred and he has no interest in the
property at commencement of the action. (Civ. Code, § 826.)
[15] Tuation-8ale for Delinquent Taxea--Purchasera--Rights.Where land has been sold to the state for delinquent taxes, the
former owner should not be permitted to retain proceeds from
the sale of timber on the land since to do so would condone
a trespass to property that Rev. & Tax. Code, § 3441, makes
a crime, would encourage the stripping of timber and removal of minerals from tax-deeded lands, and would encourage tax delinquency, since it would permit the former owner to
speculate as to whether the proceeds from the property would
be sufflcient to justify his redeeming and would permit him to
collect such proceeds until the state took steps to compel
accounting and payment and then defeat the rights of the
state by redeeming the property before judgment could be
obtained.

APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of Trinity
County. Harold Underwood, Ju(lge. Affirmed.
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Action to recoVt'r damag('!'! for timber removed from taxdeeded land prior to redemption. Judgment for plaintiff
affirmed.
BI'onson, Bl'onson & 1rIcKinnon, Harold B. McKinnon and
Falk &. Falk for Appellants.
Stanley Mosk, Attorney General, James E. Sabine and
Dan Kaufmanll, Assistant Attorneys General, and Edward P.
Hollingshead, Deputy Attorney General, for Respondent.
William R. MacDougall as Amicus Curiae on behalf of Respondent.
TRAYNOR, J.-Oll June 3, 1948, land owned by Bruce L.
and Virginia B. Codding was deeded to the state for delinquent taxes for the year 1942-1943. On August 10, 1953, while
the land was still deeded to the state, the Coddings agreed
to sell to Orval Lucas and Elwood Woodburn all the merchantable timber on the land and warranted that there were
2,000,000 feet of fir and pine. The buyers cut and removed
812,851 feet of timber, the contract price for which was
$6,502.80. They ceased cutting when the State Controller
notified them that the land had been deeded to the state.
On March 30, 1955, plaintiff filed this action under sections
344P and 36512 of the Revenue and Taxation Code to recover
the $6,502.80 for the timber removed from the land. More
than a year later, on June 22, 1956, the Coddings redeemed
the property by paying all delinquent taxes, penalties, and
interest totalling $4,194.21. The trial court found that the
cutting and removal of the timber teuded permanently to
impair the value of the property in violation of section 3441
'Section 3441 provides; "Every person who does any act ten dine
permanently to impair the value of tax Bold property or tax-deeded
property is guilty of a misdemeanor and is liable for any damages sustained by the State beeause of his act. Such acts include but are not
limited to the removal, destruction, or cutting of any impro~'ement9
or timber. On request of the Attorney General or the Controller, tlle
district attorney of the county where any part of the property is
located shall: (a) Prosecute for the commission of the misdemeanor.
(b) In the naDle of the people, sue for damages sustained by the
State."
·Section 3651 provides: "After the recording of the deed to the State,
the State has' exc.l!,lsive power througll the Controller to rent taxdeeded property amI to reeeive all proceeds nrising in any manner
from the property except proceeds from a transaction terminating the
right of redemption, if the right of redemption haa not been terminated, or from a sa.le of a pareel of tnx·deeded property."

,)
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of the Revellue and Taxation Coue allu entered juuglllcnl
for plaintiff ill the amount of $6,302.80. Defelluallts appeal.
Defendants contend that they cannot be requireu to account
for the proceeds from the sale of the timber on the grounds
that the amount they paiu to redeem the property included
taxes on the value added to the land by the timber before it
was removed and that by paying a reuemption price based
on the value of the laud including the timber they have ill
effect already paid the state for the timber. There is no
merit in this contention.
,
The amount necessary to redeem is 'specified in section 4102
of the Revenue and Taxation Code as the sum of the "sold
taxes," delinquent penalties and costs, and redemption penalties. [1] The amount of "sold taxes" is a combination of
taxes that were a lien on the property when sold to the state
and the taxes assessed for each subsequent year as shown
on the delinquent rolls or that would have been shown had
the property been assessed in cases where it was not assesseu
for any year. (Rev. & Tax. Code, § 123; Sutter-Yuba Invest.
Co. v. Waste, 21 Ca1.2d 781, 784 [136 P.2d 11].) The assessments for these taxes must take into account any reduction
in value in the years following removal of timber from the
land. (Rev. & Tax. Code, §§ 123, 401, 405, 40'6, 566,4104.)
Thus, the fact that defendants have paid the back taxes on the
property does not mean that they have paid taxes on removed
timber. [2] In auy event taxes are exactions for the support of government, not the purchase price of property. By
paying the taxes upon redemption defendants were paying
the amount due for that support and were not buying land
and timber. Even if redemption could be regarded as a purchase, however, it would be a purchase of the land in the condition it was in at the time of the redemption, and the state
wonld be no less entitled to the proceeds from the property
during its ownership than it would had the property been
sold at public auction.
[3] The deed to the state conveys absolute title to the
property. (Mercury Herald Co. v. Moore, 22 Ca1.2d 269, 273
[138 P.2d 673, 147 A.L.R. 1111].) The state can occupy such
property and exploit its natural resources and has the exclusive right to all proceeds from the property including
proceeds from such resources. (Rev. & Tax. Code, §§ 3441.
3651, supra.) It can improve the property or allow it to deteriorate in value. [ 4] The statutory provisions authorizing redemption are simply an offer by the state to reconv('y
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the property on the terms prescribed if it has not already
been sold at public auctioll. (Slttter-Yuba Invest. Co. v.
Wa.ste, 21 Ca1.2d 781, 785 [136 P.2d 11].) [5] There is
nothing in the statutes that could reasonably be construed as
implying that 011 redemption the redemptioner is entitled to
the property in the condition it was in at the time of the tax
deed. In fact sueh construction is precluded by the express
statutory rights given the state and the forfeiture of all
rights by the former owner except the privilege of redeeming
on the terms prescribed if the state has not already disposed
of the property. (Mercury Herald Co. v. Mom'e, 22 Cal.2d,
.'l1tpra.)

)

Defendants' contention that the redemption extinguished
plaintiff's cause of action would revive an issue settled adversely to them in People v. Maxfield, 30 Cal.2d 485 {183 P.2d
897}. [6] In upholding in that case the state's right to
recover rents collected by the taxpayer on tax-deeded land
between the time of the tax deed and the redemption this
court declared:
"The deed to the state, executed pursuant to the statutory
requirements, conveys absolute title, free of all encumbrances,
except certain specified liens. (Rev. & Tax. Code, § 3520.)
It is not the same title as that of a private pure.haser, because
the purpose of the conveyance is not the acquisition of the
property but the collection of the taxes. (AngZo CaZ. Nat.
Bank v. Leland, 9 Ca1.2d 347, 353 [70 P.2d 937}.) However,
the only difference between the state's title and that of a
private purchaser is the privilege of redemption. 'Upon
execution of the deed [to the State} the property owner forfeited all rights in the property except the privilege of redeeming it at any time before the state disposed of it.' (Mercury Herald Co. v. Moore, 22 Cal.2d 269, 273 [138 P.2d 673,
147 A.L.R. U11}.) The state's title is absolute, but subject
to defeasance should the former owner exercise his privilcge
of redemption. The tax collector's receipt, authorized by
section 4107 of the Revenue and Taxation Code, which is
recorded 'like a deed,' is a recollveyance of an absolute title
owned by the state and issues upon the performance of all
conditions necessary for redemption.
[7] "Rights incident to ownership of property conveyed
to the state are expressly provided for by the Revenue and
Taxation Code. These include the right to possession (§ 3653) ;
the right to rent or lease and receive the proceeds from the
property (§§ 3651 and 3655) ; the right to exact an aecounting
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of the proceeds of the property (§ 3652) ; the right to bring
an action of unlawful detainer or ejectment (§ 3654) ; and thc
right to sell the property at public auction to the highest
bidder (§ 3476). These rights are no more limited than those
of an individual who has title to real property. 'l'hey cease
upon the transfer of title but certain rights, such us that to
rents and profits which accrued during the period of ownership, are personal and do not pass with the deed nor cease
to be actionable upon the conveyance of the property.
[8] Under section 4112 of the Revenue and.. Taxation Code
the tax deed is not void from the beginning but only upon
redemption; the state's interest in the land then ceases
because title has passed to the redemptioner. At that time
the right to possession of the land, and to lease or rent and
receive the proceeds, is at an end. So also is the right to sell
the property at public auction. [9] But a right of action
which accrued during the period of ownership is not terminated by the redemption; the state is in the same position as
that of an individual who conveys land to which he has title."
(30 Ca1.2d at pp. 487-488.)
What we said in the Maxfield case is controlling here. Both
cases involve the state's right" to receive aU proceeds arising
in any manner" from tax-deeded property. (Rev. & Tax.
Code, § 3651.) In the Maxfield case the proceeds arose from
rent; here they arose from the sale of timber. (See also
Merchants Finance Gorp. v. Kuchel, 83 Cal.App.2d 579, 583
[189 P.2d 513] where the proceeds the state had the exclusive power to receive arose from the payment of damages by
the state's lessee for injury to buildings.) [ 1 0 ] The phrase
"arising in any manner" in section 3651 precludes the drawing of any distinction according to the manner in which
the proceeds arise. [11] Moreover, the making of any
exception for proceeds from the sale of timber is also foreclosed by section 3441 of the Revenue and Taxation Code,
which makes it a misdemeanor to do any act tending permanently to impair the value of tax-deeded property, including the cutting or removal of timber, and expressly provides for the recovery of damages by the state for such cutting
or removal. [ 12 ] The making of any exception for a redemptioner is foreclosed by section 3441, which refers to
•• every person" and therefore inclurles a redemptioner as
well as a stranger to the title. [13] Thus in neither section 3441, section 3651, the sections governing redemption
(Rev. & Tax. Code, §§ 4101-4114) nor in any other statute
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is there allY Pl'OYi:-iOll t hal llIai{('s the :-Iatc's right to recover
the proceeds arising froll1 the tax-deeded properly depend on
whether there has been a redemption of the property.
[14] Moreover, the state unquestionably suffered damages during the period it owned the property. .A person
having an estate in fee 01' in remainder or a reversion may
maintain an action for an injury to the inheritance even
though after its commission his estate is transferred and
he has no interest in the property at the commencement of
the action. (Civ. Code, § 826.)
[15] To permit defendants to retain the proceeds froll1
the sale of the timber would be to condone a brazen trespass
to property that section 3441 makes a crime and would encourage the stripping of timber and the removal of minerals
from tax-deeded lands. It would also encourage tax delinquency, for it would pCl'lllit the former owner to flpeculate
as to whether the proceeds from the property would be sufficient to justify his redeeming it and would permit him to
coUect such proceeds until the state took steps to compel an
accounting aud payment and then defeat the rights of the
state by redeeming the property before judgment could be
obtained. As the Maxfield case makes clear, the statutes are
plainly drawn to preclude such maneuvers.
The judgment is affirmed.
Gibson, C. J., Peters, J., White, J., and Dooling, J., concurred.
SCHAUER, J., Dissenting.-Plainti1! concedes that "unsevered trees . . . would pass with the land to the redemptioner," of tax-deeded land. I believe that the better vie,v,
and one which accords more with a sense of fairness to the
taxpayer and property owner who redeems, and with the
declared policy of the state, is that since the trees are part
of the realty on which the taxes were originally assessed and
on which the interest and penalties paid by the redemptioner
accrued, the proceeds of the cut timber should belong to the
owner who redeemed. Such proceeds plainly ditter in nature
from rentals collected for usc of the land, whieh were held to
belong to the state in the Maxfield case. (People v. lIIaxfield
(1947),30 Cal.2n 485,487-488 {1-4] (183 P.2d 897].) Mor('~
over, as reiterated in that ('ase (p.487 [1]), "the pUl'pO!'le of
the [tax] conveyance is not the acquisition of the property
but the collection of the taxes."
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In Mcrchant.~ Fillance Corp. ". lluchcl (1948), 83 Cal.
App.2d 579, 585 lIS9 P.!:!11 51:11, althongh it wal> held thaI
an owner of ulx-deeul'd property who has 1I0t redeemed it
may 110t by mandamus require the State Contt'oller "to
retain and apply" to restoration of the property D1011ey~
collected by the state from a tenant as damages to the buildings and improvements on the land, the court remarked that
"There appears to be merit ill appellant's content ion that the
owner is entitled to have the property restored, , , ill substantially the same condition , . , if and when he redeems the
property, But that question is not iilVolved in this case since
the appellant has failed to redeem ... ," Further, in People
v. Gustafson (1942), 53 Cal.App.2d 230, 234 [2] [127 P.2d
627J, it was pointed out that "it is the settled policy of the
law to give a delinquent taxpayer every reasonable opportunity compatible with the rights of the state, to redeem his
property, and to make his burden as light as possible [citations] ; and the return to the tax rolls of the property whic11
has been sold for taxes in order that it may again support
general governmental functions is in the public interest.
[Citation.] "
Certainly nothing in section 3441 of the Revenue and Taxation Code precludes retention by the o,vner of the timber
proceeds in this ease, The owner has redeemed; ergo, no damages by reason of the timber cutting may rightfully be claimNl
by the state. I would reverse the judgment,
McComb, J" concurred.
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